The role of managers within the welfare system:  how race and negative stereotypes about clients affect managers\u27 tolerance of caseworker discretion by Picciola, Alethia Marie
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2012
The role of managers within the welfare system:
how race and negative stereotypes about clients
affect managers' tolerance of caseworker discretion
Alethia Marie Picciola
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, apicci3@tigers.lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Social Work Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Picciola, Alethia Marie, "The role of managers within the welfare system: how race and negative stereotypes about clients affect
managers' tolerance of caseworker discretion" (2012). LSU Master's Theses. 3667.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/3667
THE ROLE OF MANAGERS WITHIN THE WELFARE SYSTEM: 
HOW RACE AND NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES ABOUT CLIENTS AFFECT  











Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
























I would first like to thank my committee, Dr. Michelle Livermore, Dr. Younghee Lim, and Dr. 
Belinda Davis, for being such inspiring role models and for all their support and guidance in writing 
this thesis.  I especially want to thank my committee chair, Dr. Livermore, for being my biggest 
supporter during this process.  Her unwavering faith and expert knowledge were integral to the 
completion of every step of this project.  I also would like to thank my colleague Trey Bickham for 
his friendship as we embarked on this process together.  And to Louisiana State University’s School 
of Social Work, I thank you for providing me with an excellent education.  The lessons I have 
learned there will stay with me for years to come.   
Finally, I must thank my family for their continued support.  To my mother, who has always been 
my biggest cheerleader, I thank you for always believing in me and for being the most selfless person 
I know.  Thanks to my patient and understanding fiancé, Rex Gregory, for his unconditional love and 
support through the past to years.  I must thank my Uncle Glen and Aunt Deepika for opening their 
home to me and always providing me with great food and a place to sleep.  I could not have done this 
without them.  And finally, to my grandmother, her strength and love has created a wonderful family 
of which I am honored to be a member. 
  
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..............................................................................................................ii  
 
LISTS OF TABLES……………..........................................................................................iv 





1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1  
       Statement of the Problem..............................................................................................1  
      Contributions to Current Research................................................................................1  
 
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ..........................................................................................3  
      Discrimination within the Welfare System....................................................................3  
      Caseworker Discretion ………......................................................................................6  
      Lack of Managerial Accountability vs. Lack of Client Motivation …………………13 
 
3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK...................................................................................14 
     Louisiana’s Strategies To Empower People (STEP) Program.....................................14 
                 The Potential for Informal Discretion within Louisiana’s STEP Program...................17 
          Hypotheses....................................................................................................................20 
4 METHODS.....................................................................................................................23 
      Design...........................................................................................................................23 
     Sample .........................................................................................................................23  
     Instrumentation.............................................................................................................23 
     Operationalization of Key Terms…………………………………………………….23 
     Data Analysis…………………………………………………………………..……..25 
 
5 RESULTS.......................................................................................................................29 
     Descriptive Statistics.....................................................................................................29 
     Bivariate Results...........................................................................................................35 
 
6 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................38 
      Client Motivation vs. Structural Barriers.....................................................................38 
      Variance within a Centralized System.........................................................................39 
      Differences in Managers vs. Clients’ Perceptions of Barriers to Success...................40 






LISTS OF TABLES 
4.1 H1 Variables, Level of Measurement, Coding, and Statistical Analysis…………………….26  
4.2 H2 Variables, Level of Measurement, Coding, and Statistical Analysis…………………….27  
4.3 H3 Variables, Level of Measurement, Coding, and Statistical Analysis.................................28  
5.1 Frequency Distribution of Negative Stereotypes…………………………..……………...…30  
5.2 Frequency Distribution of Barriers to Success within the STEP Program………..…………30  
5.3 Frequency Distribution of Discretion Tolerance ……………………………………………32 
5.4 Frequency Distribution for Parish Manager Race.…………………………………………..33  
 
5.5 Parish Manager Demographics……………..………………………………………………..34  




 LISTS OF FIGURES 
 




Previous research studies found differences in social welfare policy implementation based on the 
racial and ethnical differences of clients, workers, and managers.  The public perception of 
welfare recipients being content with living on government money and unmotivated to become 
self-sufficient is a central theme throughout American culture.  The current study examined 
whether parish-level managers’ personal beliefs about their clients are associated with their 
tolerance of frontline staff’s discretionary practices.  Additionally, the author examined the role 
that the race of managers plays in the personal beliefs they hold about their clients as well as 
their tolerance of frontline discretion.  This study used cross sectional research with secondary 
data from an internet survey.  No statistically significant relationships between negative 
stereotypes, discretion tolerance, and race were found.  However, this study revealed that the 
majority of parish-level managers within the Louisiana STEP program partially blame clients for 
their lack of success within the program despite managers’ admission that STEP participants 
lacked sufficient education and transportation needed to succeed within the program.  The 
current study also revealed that large variations, not intended in a centralized system, exist 
among Louisiana parishes in terms of STEP policy implementation regarding discretion.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Frontline worker discretion has been the primary focus of research studies on discretion 
within policy implementation.  The role of management has been evaluated in regards to their 
control over staff’s use of discretion.  Conversely, there has been a good deal of research on the 
influence that management has on the culture of their organizations in ways that influence 
service delivery (Davis et al., 2011a; Evans, 2011; Riccucci, 2004).  
 The purpose of this study is two-fold.  First, the author seeks to assess whether parish-
level managers’ personal beliefs about their clients are associated with their tolerance of frontline 
staff’s discretionary practices.  Secondly, the author seeks to examine the role that the race of 
managers plays in managers’ personal beliefs about their clients as well as their tolerance of 
frontline discretion.  The author’s goal is to determine whether character judgments and negative 
stereotyping on the part of program managers are associated with implementation disparities 
among agencies within a centralized system.  The author argues that managerial beliefs about the 
populations who are being served affect the degree to which they tolerate informal caseworker 
discretion. 
Contributions to Current Research 
This study is a continuation of a larger body of research conducted by Davis et al. 
(2011b) that established a connection between race and policy implementation within social 
service programs in Louisiana.  Their study found that work activity programs with African 
American managers were more likely to provide both white and minority participants with 
vocational education, which suggests that minorities who are in positions of power within the 
welfare system are more generous across racial lines with regards to distribution of scarce 
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resources (Davis et al., 2011a).  This research confirmed that even in a centralized program, such 
as that found in Louisiana, significant differences in service delivery may exist based on the race 
of parish-level managers.  
Davis et al.’s (2011b) study revealed that managers’ individual characteristics influenced 
how their offices deliver services to clients.  Regardless of whether this discretion works in favor 
or against clients, it creates inconsistencies throughout policy implementation that should be 
examined to increase the equitable distribution of resources.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 This chapter begins with a review of research on discrimination within the welfare 
system in order to familiarize the reader with the racial disparities that exist there.  The author 
then reviews literature on the effects of caseworker discretion on the welfare system.  This 
section describes the ideological arguments about frontline worker autonomy versus managerial 
control.  Finally, this discussion leads into a review of Taylor et al.’s (2011) study which speaks 
of national stereotypes against welfare recipients and the influences these beliefs have on 
managers’ lack of accountability within the welfare system. 
Discrimination within the Welfare System  
 According to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA), service providers should use some discretion when determining eligibility 
requirements and delivery of service to welfare recipients (Berman et al., 2004; Gooden, 2006).  
Therefore, it is important for researchers to examine the variables influencing the use of 
discretion in order to ensure that policies are being implemented as intended (Gooden, 2006; 
Lipsky 1980; Riccucci, 2004).  If a policy is implemented in a socially equitable way, the 
fairness of procedures, access to services, delivery of services, and goal attainment should be 
relatively the same regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender of the client (Gooden, 2006, p. 6).  
However, since the development of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
programs under PRWORA, research has shown racial and ethnic disparities in policy outcomes 
for clients (Davis, Lim, & Livermore, 2011a; Davis, Livermore, & Lim, 2011b; Keiser, Mueser, 
& Choi, 2004; Gooden, 2006; Marchevsky & Theoharis, 2008).   
These disparities are, unfortunately, not surprising due to the fact that the image of what 
Hancock (2003) calls “the welfare queen” is one that was alluded to in more than half of the US 
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congressional proceedings during the 1996 reformation of the welfare system into PRWORA (p. 
31). The public perception of African-American women being content with living on 
government money and unmotivated to become self-sufficient shaped welfare reform and 
weakened this marginalized populations right to government resources in the eyes of policy 
makers (Hancock, 2003).  According to Taylor, Samblanet, and Seale (2011), the image of the 
welfare queen gained national recognition when Ronald Reagan told the story of a women using 
welfare money to buy a Cadillac instead of supporting her family during his 1980 presidential 
campaign.  White political thinking has been heavily influenced by this view of African-
Americans as lazy and unmotivated and is related to negative attitudes about who should receive 
welfare (Gilens, 1995; Hancock, 2003; Taylor et al., 2011).  The examples outlined below are 
research studies that found differences in social welfare policy implementation based on the 
racial and ethnical differences of clients, workers, and managers. 
Marchevsky and Theoharis’s (2008) research on the experiences of Mexican immigrants 
who were clients of a TANF program in Los Angeles Country revealed “unlawful reductions or 
termination of immigrant benefits; harassment and humiliation through Job Club; and the 
tracking of immigrants away from education and into low-wage jobs” (p. 71).  The study also 
showed that at the end of the two-year study, none of the 14 Latina women in the sample who 
had participated in TANF had found employment that would raise them above the poverty line 
and few had permanent job placements (Marchevsky & Theoharis, 2008). 
Keiser et al. (2004)’s evaluation of the sanctioning practices within TANF in Missouri 
showed a complex and significant relationship between race and sanctioning.  Within every 
county in Missouri, minority individuals were more likely to be sanctioned than white 
individuals who shared the same demographic characteristics (Keiser et al., 2004).  This means 
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that minorities were either being treated differently by front line workers or that there was a 
bureaucratic bias within the state policy that contributed to increased difficulties for minorities to 
meet requirements than for white TANF recipients (Keiser et al., 2004).  This study also revealed 
the importance of county-level characteristics that impeded the prevalence of sanctioning for all 
TANF recipients in counties where minorities were in positions of political power, where more 
than half of the population voted for the Democratic Party, or where more than half the TANF 
recipients were minority individuals (Keiser et al., 2004). 
 Further research shows that political climate, community culture, and values influence 
policy implementation (Weissert, 1994).  This study showed that agencies located in 
ideologically liberal counties were more generous with Medicaid funds.  Managers were more 
willing to participate in outreach and more knowledgeable about other services available to their 
clients within the community than in conservative communities even though the implementation 
of Medicaid policy should have been uniformly implemented throughout the state (Weissert, 
1994).  Though Weissert (1994) was able to determine that discretion was widely used among 
case managers, her study did not reveal any relationship between the generosity of county 
agencies and the use of discretion among case managers.  In fact, managers’ political beliefs 
were more related to the generosity of agency spending than with case managers’ use of 
discretion.  
All of these studies reveal that race and ethnicity of both participants and workers are 
related to program outcomes.  Regardless of how centralized policies are, the every day decisions 





Street- level Bureaucracy and the Beginnings of Policy Research on Discretion  
Michael Lipsky’s book, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services, began the discussion about the role of discretion within policy (Evans & Harris, 2004).  
Lipsky’s (1980) work focuses on how direct service providers are pressured into making 
decisions about how to implement policies, and how these decisions change or modify the 
original objectives of the policies.  Lipsky (1980) coined the term “street-level bureaucrat” in 
reference to “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, 
and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work.” 
According to Lipsky (1980), clients’ needs vary so greatly that it is impossible to have a 
policy that encompasses every possible course of action needed to respond to people’s unique 
situations.  Through these unpredictable circumstances, street-level bureaucrats are required to 
use professional judgment in ways that often modify policy regulations (Evans & Harris, 2004; 
Lipsky, 1980).  However, Lipsky (1980) points out that like everyone else, street-level 
bureaucrats develop “personal standards of whether or not someone is deserving” based on their 
individual experiences (p. 23).  Therefore, Lipsky (1980) stresses that the professional nature of 
a street-level bureaucrat requires a level of competency to provide services that are appropriate 
for clients’ needs.  The privilege to exercise professional judgment should be bound to an ethical 
code to ensure that the professional is acting in the individualized interest of his or her client and 
outside the pursuit of personal gain or preferences (Lipsky, 1980). 
The complexity of the issues street-level bureaucrats face, the lack of resources they are 
given, and the ambiguous objectives within the policies they are asked to implement cause street-
level bureaucrats to feel isolated and undervalued (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980).  
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Problems arise when these obstacles appear so frequently that street-level bureaucrats are no 
longer exercising professional judgment in an individualized fashion but are ubiquitously 
changing regulations in attempts to correct policies that do not meet the needs of their clients 
(Lipsky, 1980). There is a tendency to stereotype their clients and routinize their work in a way 
that produces only a portion of the outcomes intended by policies based on their limited 
resources (Lipsky, 1980).  
The Bottom-Up Perspective. Lipsky (1980) believed that policy outcomes had more to 
do with decisions made between clients and street-level bureaucrats on the ground than with the 
actual policies made by bureaucrats at the top of the political chain of command.  This view of 
policy implementation is called “the bottom-up perspective” (Hudson & Lowe, 2009, p. 208).  
Hudson and Lowe (2009) stated that this idea grew in reaction to the top-down perspective that a 
well-developed policy will yield the results intended by its writers.  The problem with the top-
down perspective is that it assumed rationality on the part of those who deliver services and 
uniformity within problem solutions (Hudson & Lowe, 2009).  
Lipsky’s analysis of direct service clearly pointed to bottom-up implementation of policy 
(Ellis, 2011; Evans, 2011; Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Weissert, 1994).  Evans (2009), however, 
adds that Lipsky’s recommendation of better policy implementation is a balance between top-
down and bottom-up perspectives.  Although Lipsky believed that policy makers unavoidably 
create and modify policies based on data gathered from the way policy ideas are actually 
delivered (bottom-up), he also thought that discretion best meets the needs of individuals when it 
is rooted in “strategic policy intention” (top-down), which speaks to his thoughts about the 
importance of professional judgment and organizational standards (Evans, 2011, p. 370).  
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Variables Contributing to the Use of Discretion. Lipsky (1980) reasoned that two of 
the major variables contributing to street-level bureaucrats’ need for the use of discretion were 
lack of resources available to accomplish policy objectives and the need to interpret vague policy 
objectives that often conflicts with agency objectives. 
Rationing Resources. In order for street-level bureaucrats to provide clients with the 
individual attention required to use professional judgment, they need to be able to spend time 
with each client (Bloom, Hill, & Riccio 2003).  Bloom et al. (2003) pointed out that this cannot 
happen if frontline staff is overloaded with clients.   
In a study conducted by Ellis (2011) that measured the influence discretion played in the 
implementation of the National Health Service and Community Care Act, social workers stated 
that their lack of resources to fully implement all policy objectives universally contributed to 
stereotyping and deliberate changes in policy regulations to limit access to services in a manner 
that violated the rights of clients and conflicted with the social workers’ code of ethics.  This 
example demonstrates Lipsky’s (1980) point that large caseloads and insufficient resources force 
street-level bureaucrats to make concessions about delivery of services in ways that are 
incongruous and outside the requirements of policies. Lipsky (1980) states that,  
“At best, street-level bureaucrats incent benign modes of mass processing that 
more or less permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately, and 
successfully. At worst, they give in to favoritism, stereotyping, and routinizing – 
all of which serve private or agency purposes.” (p. xii)   
Lipsky (1980) also stated that while street-level bureaucrats are under pressure to 
accomplish lofty outcomes with little resources, they must be careful not to appear to be denying 
people their human rights.  Street-level bureaucrats are often asked by management to do away 
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with extraneous programing and focus on the most vital needs of clients (Lipsky, 1980). 
Ambiguous Polices. Lipsky (1980) stated that the vague language used to describe goals 
within policies requires street-level bureaucrats to use discretion when interpreting these goals.  
Lipsky (1980) saw this space for interpretation as one way that street-level bureaucrats tailored 
policies to fit ideas about what services should be delivered.  Discretion can either be used 
creatively to fit policies with the needs of clients or as a means of denying clients access to 
resources.  Street-level bureaucrats can ignore their powers of discretion to make exceptions for 
fear of being held accountable (Lipsky, 1980).  In this way, vague policies can be used by both 
street-level bureaucrats and policy makers to avoid responsibility should the policy fail to 
produce the desired outcomes (Lipsky, 1980).   
With unclear objectives, progress can be difficult to measure and track (Evans & Harris, 
2004).  As stated earlier, street-level bureaucrats’ work is autonomous due to the nature of 
individualized responses to their clients’ needs.  This limits managerial control over street-level 
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980).  Furthermore, it is Lipsky’s (1980) belief that managers’ concerns 
with accomplishing agency objectives lead them to ignore the changes street-level bureaucrats 
make to policies with the idea that these changes will get things done (Lipsky, 1980).   
Lack of Emphasis on Managerial Influence. Lipsky (1980) contributed an invaluable 
body of knowledge that expanded researchers’ understanding about the vital role that frontline 
staff play in policy implementation.  However, Lipsky underestimated the role the management 
plays in policy implementation.  Evans (2011) pointed out that Lipsky made blanket assumptions 
about managers, viewing them as “policy lieutenants” who are fully committed to implementing 
policies and agency objectives with the highest fidelity possible (p. 372).  Instead, Evans (2011) 
claimed that managers play a vital role in shaping the discretionary practices within policy.  
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Lipsky (1980) also conjectured that managers are only interested in outcome results, and they 
concern themselves with the methods of service delivery only in the areas that the agency will be 
evaluated.  This viewpoint assumes that managers are not invested in creating an organizational 
culture that is pleasant and functional for both staff and clients.  
Davis et al.’s (2011b) research findings negated Lipsky’s grouping of managerial styles 
by establishing that even in a centralized policy, some managers went above and beyond their 
required tasks to voluntarily incorporate community networking as a valuable resource for the 
agency and its clients.  When managers engaged in community networking, participants were 
more likely to be placed in work activity settings that yielded the probability of higher paying job 
placements (Davis et al., 2011b; Davis et al., 2011a), which confirmed that the discretionary 
actions of managers influences service delivery despite the lack of face-to-face encounters they 
have with clients.   
Reactions to Lipsky’s Work. The majority of research on discretion today is divided 
into two schools of thought: those who argue that discretion no longer exists within social 
services since the rise of managerial power and technological developments that helped track 
regulations and performance indicators within policies in attempts to standardize implementation 
practices (Howe, 1996; Jones, 2001); and those who expound Lipsky’s continued relevance 
within policy implementation and develop the role of discretion within direct services further 
(Ellis, 2011; Evans, 2011; Evans & Harris, 2004; Halliday, Burns, Hutton, McNeil, & Tata, 
2009).  Regardless of researchers views on what is happening today, these scholars do not 
dispute the significance of Lipsky’s work as an insightful look at the way that street-level 
bureaucrats cope with the demands of their jobs, and in the process, shape policies (Halliday et 
al., 2009).  
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Professionalism vs. Managerialism  
 The New Public Management (NPM), also known as managerialism, was a model of 
policy implementation that was popular post-WWII until the 1990s in which researchers 
attempted to accomplish social equity within policy implementation and globalize policy 
agendas (Hood, 1991).  This was done by increasing managers’ power over their frontline 
workers through defining goals and measuring competence of practice (Howe, 1996).  Unlike 
Lipsky’s skepticism for managers’ ability to control frontline workers, NPM argued that 
managers alone should have the discretionary power to engineer agency procedures that respond 
to their frontline workers’ bottom-up needs (Hood, 1991; Hudson & Lowe, 2009).  More 
emphasis was placed on agency outcomes rather than methods of service delivery as a means of 
top-down quantitative outcome measurements (Hood, 1991; Hudson & Lower, 2009).  In this 
way, NPM is a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up schools of thought with agency 
managers are the primary decision makers about implementation procedures (Hudson & Lowe, 
2009). 
In the 1990s, research showed that NPM was not as successful at standardizing practice 
as originally intended (Hood, 1995).  Evans and Harris (2004) asserted that more rules and 
regulations disrupt progress by confusing frontline workers.  Policy writers and frontline staff 
can also use intricate rules to blame one another by claiming that the rules were not followed 
correctly or that the rules did not service the needs of clients (Evans & Harris, 2004).  
Additionally, Lymbery (2011) pointed out that the assessment and evaluation processes that 
frontline workers perform on their clients require the application and synthesis of knowledge, 
which requires a level of creativity that is not measurable through quantitative benchmarks.  He 
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stressed that competence measures do not convey the creativity needed to complete the complex 
tasks of frontline workers (Lymbery, 2011). 
Lymbery’s (2011) argument echoes Lipsky’s (1980) claim that professional judgment is 
often required in order to respond to the unique needs of clients.  Evans (2011) develops this idea 
further by stating that ethical codes influence the motivations of professionals’ use of discretion 
by changing the culture of service agencies to regard equanimity and competence.  Unlike 
Lipsky (1980), who saw managers as evaluating the discretionary practices of their staff in the 
interest of the organization, Evans (2011) saw managers as active participants in the 
implementation process who worked in collaboration with their staff to deliver services.  
Evans (2011) claimed that the degree of professionalism exhibited by frontline staff 
influences managerial style and the nature of the discretion that is utilized.  While Freidson 
(2001) agreed with Evans, he believed that the professional status of the manager in relation to 
his or her staff held more significance.  When managers come from the same profession as their 
staff, they are bound by the same ethical codes, have similar motivations, and have the ability to 
create an organizational culture that promotes such professional standards (Freidson, 2001).  
Freidson (2001) also pointed to the professional’s ability to control his or her own work as a 
necessity due to the very essence of a profession, which should be understood and respected by 
management.  He emphasized the importance of peer reviews in establishing and enforcing 
standards that bind a profession to the ethical use of discretion while still allowing individual 
professionals the freedom to control their own work (Freidson, 2001).  Freidson (2001) claimed 
that when managers are not only concerned with policy outcomes, but are also invested in 
upholding professional ethics, there is less divide between the intentions of staff and 
administration. 
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Where NPM seeks to rigidly define direct service outcomes for the sake of gaining 
confidence in policy, professionalism seeks to define the ethical codes of a profession for the 
sake of gaining trust and increasing competence of frontline staff (Smith, 2001).  By creating a 
culture that is committed to professionalism, managers are able to trust the discretion of their 
staff (Evans, 2011; Freidson, 2001).  In this way, managers should be actively engaged in 
training and supervision to support frontline staff for the purpose of maintaining ethical service 
delivery (Freidson, 2001).  
Lack of Managerial Accountability vs. Lack of Client Motivation  
Taylor et al. (2011) conducted a study that sought county managers’ opinions about why 
welfare was failing in its goal to help clients become self-sufficient. Taylor et al.’s (2011) study 
consisted of a phone survey of county managers from a welfare-to-work program in North 
Carolina.  Although they did not intent to measure managers’ attitudes about clients and never 
mentioned client motivation in the interview questions, almost half of the managers cited a lack 
of client motivation as a barrier to the success of their program.   
Taylor et al.’s (2011) study concluded that when failure occurred in the program, the 
clients were the ones blamed.  Even though managers reported a number of structural 
deficiencies within the program, such as “a lack of funding, staff, daycare, job coaching, work, 
hours, volunteer sites, comprehensive evaluation assessment (to determine both clients’ work 
and family needs), mentoring, parenting classes, mental health and substance abuse services, and 
transportation” (p. 178), the tendency among managers was to discuss a lack of motivation as 
one of the biggest variables in client failure (Taylor et al., 2011).  One of the reasons managers are 
so quick to blame clients is that managers do not want to look at their own responsibilities and the ways in 
which they may be deficient in their role as a program manager (Taylor et al., 2011).   
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Louisiana’s Strategies To Empower People (STEP) Program 
 The focus of this thesis is on Strategies to Empower People (STEP), a centralized welfare 
program in Louisiana.  STEP is a program administered by the Office of Family Support (OFS) 
with the goal of aiding clients in acquiring permanent employment as a means to self-sufficiency 
(Berman et al., 2004).  Louisiana developed the STEP program in 2003 as a means of reforming 
the Family Independence Work Program (FIND Work) partly for the purpose of increasing 
standardized practices by working more closely with state agencies instead of private contractors 
(Berman et al., 2004).  Other reasons for the change included requiring all participants to engage 
in job readiness activities, improving the outcomes of the job readiness program, identifying 
barriers to employment, and working with participants to eliminate those barriers (Berman et al., 
p. i). 
Participation in STEP is required for all individuals receiving cash assistance from the 
Family Independence Temporary Assistance Program (FITAP) who are deemed “work-eligible”, 
which is defined as individuals who are not over the age of 60, permanently disabled or 
incapacitated, or caring for a family member who is disabled or incapacitated (Berman et al. 
2004, p. 9). Therefore, whether an individual is required to participate in STEP requires some 
discretion on the part of the Intake Analyst.  Determining what a family member is or how many 
hours a day a person needs to be attending to the family member are not straightforward and 
require a judgment call from the STEP worker.   
 Once an individual is deemed eligible for STEP, he or she attends an orientation, a 2-
week job readiness training.  After a client has completed job readiness training, a group staffing, 
which includes “the Intake Analyst, STEP Case Management Analyst, Job Readiness Facilitator, 
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and appropriate OFS supervisors” (p. 103), is required to review the client’s assessment findings, 
previous job history, and special needs (Berman et al., 2004).  Together, the group places the 
client in a work activity and provides additional services such as transportation and childcare as 
deemed necessary (Berman, et al., 2004).  The case manager then takes over the case and meets 
with the client to complete a Family Success Agreement (FSA) (Berman et al., 2004).   
The following list includes approved work activities with which single-parent STEP 
participants engaged in them from June 2003 to June 2004: unsubsidized employment, 
vocational education, work experience, job search and job readiness, school attendance, on-the-
job training, education related to employment, subsidized public employment, and subsidized 
private employment (Berman et al.).  If an individual is pregnant or has children under the age of 
one, he or she is assigned to the Parenting Skills Training in place of the Job Readiness program 
for his or her first work activity (Berman et al., 2004).  Case managers continued to meet with 
participants throughout the duration of the program for counseling and monitoring as well as 
transportation, childcare assistance, and out-of-agency referrals (Berman et al., 2004).  
Significance of Work Activities Placement 
Assignment into particular work activities is determined by the OFS STEP Case 
Management Analyst with the help of information collected by a OFS Intake Analyst, a 
Louisiana Department of Labor Job Readiness Facilitator, and other relevant staff who discuss a 
participant’s “test scores, assessments, case notes, career interests, educational needs, 
employment barriers, attitude and behavior” (Berman et al., p. 10). 
Work activities are significantly unequal in terms of the work experience gained within 
the different activities, which in turn, translates into varying potential for job attainment upon 
completion of the activity (Davis et al., 2011b; Gooden, 2006).  For example, Davis et al.’s 
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(2011a) study concluded that on-the-job training increased not only one’s chances of attaining 
employment, but it also increased average annual earning by $2,423.  Vocational education 
increased average annual earnings by $428, but it did not increase the probability of attaining 
employment (Davis et al., 2011b).  Therefore, individuals who are placed in an on-the-job 
training work activity or vocational education will most likely more than those who are placed in 
different work activities, those placed in an on-the-job training work activity will most likely 
have higher earnings than an individual who was placed in a vocational education work activity. 
Sanctions 
Sanctions are meant to be used as a last resort for clients who are not in compliance with 
requirements for the STEP program.  A sanction can be enforced on a STEP participant if he or 
she misses an appointment with a case manager or does not complete the required hours for 
weekly work activities in a given month without “good cause” (Berman et al., 2004).  
“Good cause reasons include: lack of appropriate child care or transportation 
(within specified limits); situations related to domestic violence or to treating a 
mental or physical illness, including substance abuse; temporary, short-term 
illness, or the temporary care of a family member who is ill; or emergency crisis, 
such as homelessness, fire, accident, dislocation due to natural causes, hurricane, 
or flood” (Berman et al., 2004, p. 15).   
The first sanction results in a denial of FITAP cash benefits for a minimum of one month, the 
second sanction withholds a minimum of two month’s benefits, and the third sanction withholds 
a minimum of three month’s benefits (Berman et al., 2004, p. 112).  Adults with children over 
six years old are required to participate in work activities for at least 30 hours per week; adults 
with children under six must participate in their work activities for at least 20 hours per week 
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(Berman et al., 2004, p. 5).  
Davis et al.’s (2011a) study showed that STEP participants who were sanctioned during 
their time in the program earned less on average than those who were not sanctioned.  Wu (2008) 
found similar results showing that sanctions were related to the decrease in probability of job 
attainment, lower average earnings, and premature exiting of the program.  These findings 
suggest that the intended purpose of the sanctions, which is to modify participants’ behaviors 
toward job training and employment, is not being achieved (Davis et al., 2011b).   
The Potential for Informal Discretion within Louisiana’s STEP Program 
Implementation of Louisiana’s STEP policy allows frontline workers’ use of discretion 
within the confines of predetermined criteria, thus operating under a hybrid of managerial control 
and professional judgment (Berman et al., 2004).  Sanctions, eligibility, work activities 
placement should be determined using policy guidelines by ultimately decided at the discretion 
of frontline.  Berman et al. (2004) outlined several areas where implementation could be 
improved to better match policy outcomes.  The analysis was based on in-depth evaluations of 15 
of 69 parish offices in Louisiana.  The examples below show areas where informal discretion 
may be used and come from Berman et al.’s (2004) evaluation of the STEP implementation 
process based on data collected from all the OFS agencies in Louisiana.  Berman et al. (2004) 
frame the use of discretion as a positive behavior that would increase the STEP program’s 
effectiveness.  However, it is important to note that discretion can also be negative or 
problematic for clients as Lipsky (1980) pointed out the discretion can be used to cut corners and 




Eligibility Confusion  
Several STEP Intake Analysts stated that they did not feel confident in their knowledge 
of all the differing eligibility requirements for the various programs they were charged with 
assessing (Berman et al., 2004).  This may lead to unintended discretion for the sake of 
expediting intakes, which would strengthen the claim that too many regulations cause confusion, 
and thus informal discretion (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980).  
Heavy Caseloads  
Within the 15 parishes that Berman et al. (2004) visited, case Management Analysts 
reported having individual caseloads ranging from 30 to 120 cases per worker with an average of 
69 cases per worker. As cited by Lipsky (1980) and Ellis (2011), large caseloads add to the 
probability of routinized work, stereotyping, and forced informal discretion due to the lack of 
individualized attention frontline workers need to exercise professional judgment.  
Performance Indicator Confusion  
OFS staff showed inconsistencies in understanding the role of performance indicators.  
Workers reported feeling pressure to maintain the rates of participation within the program 
despite being told to focus on the best work placement for the client as the priority.  Workers saw 
these goals as conflicting, and thus were unsure how to proceed (Berman et al., 2004).  With 
conflicting objectives, workers are free to decide for themselves which objective to prioritize 
regardless of the intended agency priority (Ellis, 2011; Lipsky, 1980). 
Inconsistent Use of Assessment Tools  
STEP facilitators reported using different assessment tools to determine the skill-level of 
clients (Berman et al., 2004).  Within the 15 parishes visited by Berman et al., 2004, 70% 
reported using Pre-WorkKeys, and less than half reported using the other four assessment tools 
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designed to measure clients’ occupational interests, skills, reasoning and thinking styles, 
behavioral traits, and basic reading, mathematics, and language skills.  Additionally, these 
assessment tools were intended to be used in conjunction with previous work experience to place 
clients into work activities.  However, facilitators used their own informal discretion to 
determine which assessment tool best evaluated their clients (Berman et al., 2004).  The 
assessment tools did not change according to the individual need of each client, but rather was 
uniformly implemented based on the facilitator’s judgment of the tool.  Thirty-five percent of 
facilitators reported not evaluating their clients’ previous work experience at all (Berman et al., 
2004).  This is an example of resource rationing in the sense that facilitators decide whether to 
provide their clients the resource of the varying assessment tools due to lack of time or confusion 
on how to use the tool.   
Sanctions 
Berman et al. (2004) reported that only two parishes out of the 15 sites visited had an 
office policy that matched the STEP policy to only use sanctions as a last resort. Six parishes 
reported an increase in sanctioning since the implementation of STEP (Berman et al., 2004).  
Sanctioning can have serious consequences for a family in poverty because of the removal of 
benefits, thus uniformity of sanctioning practices throughout the state should be a priority. 
Managerial Role in Informal Discretion 
 Nearly all of the recommendations made by Berman et al. (2004) were directed toward 
the administrative staff. This included more staff training, more communication between agency 
managers, and more mentoring between managers and staff.  Specifically, Berman et al. (2004) 
recommended more collaboration between managers and frontline staff in order to eliminate 
confusion about eligibility, performance indicators, and assessment tools.  Berman et al. (2004) 
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also suggested that managers take a more active role in helping case managers troubleshoot 
difficult cases.  Additionally, Berman et al. (2004) advocated for a state-wide collaboration 
between parish-level managers to develop a strategy that would more equally distribute 
caseloads among caseworkers.  Thus, all of the variables that increase the probability of informal 
discretion used by staff are issues that could be improved by the administration of STEP 
agencies. 
Summary 
Currently, STEP recipients experience disparities in service due to the demographic 
characteristics of both agency managers and clients (Davis et al., 2011a).  This occurs as a result 
of day-to-day decisions that stray from policy intentions made by the people who deliver services 
(Lipsky, 1980).  Because frontline staff have the ability to greatly affect the ways policies are 
implemented (Lipsky, 1980), a commitment to professional integrity is vital to the equitable 
distribution of resources (Evans, 2011; Freidson, 2001).  Policy confusion, lack of resources, and 
inconsistent measurements are variables within the STEP program that increase the probability 
that frontline staff will deliver services in ways that were not intended by the STEP policy 
(Berman et al., 2004).  All of these barriers can be remedied through administrative restructuring 
of policy implementation procedures (Berman et al., 2004).  Therefore, the author argues that the 
beliefs that managers hold about the clients they serve impact the level of competence and 
equanimity with which an agency implements STEP policies.  
Hypotheses 
Exercising discretion when determining STEP participation, work activity placement, and 
sanction recipients requires more time and is a more lenient practice than uniformly categorizing 
STEP participants.  Based on STEP policy, a FITAP recipient could have the STEP participation 
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requirement waved if he or she is caring for a family member who is disabled or incapacitated 
(Berman et al., 2004).  The determination of who family members are and how much time an 
individual has to spend caring for the family member requires discretion.  Because participation 
in STEP is the default requirement for FITAP recipients, caseworkers who use discretion in 
terming eligibility would have to take a more nuanced look into their clients’ lives, which 
requires more time. 
Additionally, Davis et al. (2011b) found that STEP participants who were placed in on-the-
job training and vocational education for their work activity made more money upon leaving the 
program than those who did not.  STEP workers should use discretion in determining which 
STEP participants are in need of the added instruction that on-the-job training and vocational 
education provide. 
And finally, STEP policy clearly states that sanctions should only be given to participants as 
a last resort, yet many STEP workers are not aware of this (Berman et al., 2004).  Due to the 
serious consequences that result from sanctions, STEP workers should sanction when it is truly 
the last option.  
 Based on these policy observations, using discretion with STEP participants works to the 
client’s advantage.  Therefore, the author hypothesizes that STEP managers who see STEP 
participants as largely responsible for their economic struggles, due to laziness, lack of 
motivation, etc., are less likely to tolerant caseworker discretion with STEP participants. 
H1: Parish-level managers who have negative stereotypes about clients are less likely to tolerate 
caseworker discretion in determining: 
a) Whether or not someone is required to participate in STEP. 
b) What type of work activity in which a STEP participant should engage.  
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c) When a FITAP or STEP recipient should be sanctioned.   
Another aim of this study is to determine if race plays a role in this dialog about the level of 
blame parish-level managers place on clients for economic struggle and if/how this affects policy 
implementation.  Davis et al. (2011b) have already determined that non-White STEP managers 
are more generous with referrals and work placements for all STEP participants.  This study 
seeks to examine whether non-White managers are more generous in implementation than white 
managers within a population that was 80.25% African American between October 1st, 2003 and 
September 30th, 2006 (Livermore et al., 2007, p. A-2).   
H2: Non-White parish-level manager are less likely to have negative stereotypes about clients. 
H3: Non-White parish-level managers are more likely to tolerant caseworker discretion in 
determining:  
a) Whether or not someone is required to participate in STEP. 
b) What type of work activity in which a STEP participant should engage. 
c) When a FITAP or STEP recipient should be sanctioned. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
Design 
This study used cross-sectional research with secondary data from an internet survey. 
Bivariate analysis of the data was performed to investigate the interrelationships of managers’ 
beliefs about clients, policy implementation, and the race of managers. 
Sample 
Parish-level managers from the STEP program in Louisiana were invited to participate in 
an internet survey; 60 out of 64 responded.  IRB exemption was granted for the purpose of this 
study due to the secondary nature of the data and the fact that all subjects were anonymous. 
Instrumentation 
Davis et al., (2011b) constructed a 46-item survey to be self-administered by managers 
for the purpose of measuring agency implementation of the STEP policy in July 2007.  The 
current study analyzed 7 items from the survey that tracked managerial attitudes about clients, 
policy implementation, and the race of managers. 
Operationalization of Key Terms 
 Negative Stereotypes about Clients  
Negative stereotypes about clients were measured based on the level of responsibility 
managers placed on clients’ need for welfare.  Managers were asked to pick three characteristics 
that they believed were clients’ biggest barriers to self-sufficiency.   
Managers from Taylor et al. (2011)’s study did not use blatant language such as calling 
clients “welfare queens” to describe clients.  Instead, several managers mentioned lack of 
motivation and pointed to ways that clients were personally responsible for their need of 
government assistance.  Taylor et al. (2011) attribute these claims to beliefs that class 
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inequalities in the United States are “justified with reference to individual ability, effort, and 
moral worth” (p. 185). 
Therefore, for this study, negative stereotypes about clients are reflected in the following 
answers: lack a sense of personal responsibility, lack of motivation, too many children, started 
their families too young, belief that the effort is not rewarded, and believe that nothing is going 
to change.  These answers were chosen to reflect negative stereotypes about clients because they 
point to problems that clients are responsible for and are unrelated to structural problems within 
the STEP program. 
According to Taylor et al. (2011), managers who mentioned structural variables that 
contribute to client success within a program, such as lack of available jobs, lack of 
transportation, lack of childcare, lack of mental illness and substance abuse treatment, and lack 
of education, had an awareness of external variables that are largely outside of clients’ control.  
These variables contribute to clients’ difficulties in successfully completing welfare-to-work 
programs such as STEP (Taylor et al. 2011).  Therefore, when managers stated answers such as 
lack of education, lack of job skills, lack of available jobs, suffer from mental illness, suffer from 
substance abuse issues, victims of domestic violence, lack of transportation, and lack reliable 
childcare as barriers of client success in STEP, they demonstrated an understanding about 
structural problems within the STEP program and society at large.  Managers were given the 
opportunity to write another unmentioned variable as well.  
Negative stereotypes about clients were measured at the ratio level from 0-3 based on the 
number of answers managers selected that indicated beliefs that clients’ were personally 
responsible for their success or failure within STEP.  For example, if a manager were to report a 
lack a sense of personal responsibility, belief that the effort is not rewarded, and lack of 
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education as the three biggest barriers to success, that manager would receive a score of 2.  Note 
that a score of “0” is meaningful in that it indicates the manager did not select any negative 
stereotypes about clients.  This was an independent variable in the analysis of discretion 
tolerance and staff assignments, and it was treated as a dependent variable in relation to 
managerial race. 
 Discretion Tolerance  
According to Berman et al. (2004), work activity placement does rely on the discretion of 
the case manager as well as the Intake Analysis, Job Readiness Facilitator, and appropriate 
supervisors (Berman et al., 2004).  The decision to sanction a client is at the discretion of the 
case manager and should be used as a last resort (Berman et al., 2004). Therefore, managers were 
asked if eligibility, work activity placement, and sanctioning were straightforward (0) or required 
the discretion of the case manager based on his/her experience and knowledge of a client (1).  
For this binary measure, a 1 indicates discretion.  These variables were treated as dependent 
variables in relation to negative stereotypes about clients and managers’ race. 
Managers’ Race 
 The survey asked each manager for his/her race.  Data was collected nominally to 
measure race (White = 1; Non-white = 0).  This was an independent variable in relation to 
discretion tolerance and negative stereotypes about clients. 
Data Analysis 
 Hypothesis testing as well as descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations were 
analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences™ (SPSS).  Discretion tolerance and 
minority variables were dichotomous.  Negative stereotypes about clients were ordinal. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables were reported using frequency and percentages.   
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Chi-squared tests (x2) were used to analyze the relationships between parish managers’ 
race and the following measures of discretion: tolerance of discretion in determining if a client is 
required to participate in STEP, tolerance of discretion in determining placement in work 
activities, and tolerance of discretion in determining sanctions.  
















































The researcher performed Spearman’s rho (β) to evaluate the relationship that negative 
stereotypes have with discretion tolerance and the minority status of managers.  The researcher 
























And finally, spearman’s rho (β) was also used to determine if bivariate correlations 
existed between negative stereotypes about clients and the above-mentioned measures of 
discretion.  Chi-squared (x2) was also used to determine if negative stereotypes about clients 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 This research examined the relationships between race, negative stereotypes about clients, 
and tolerance of caseworker discretion by managers.  Of the 60 parish managers from 
Louisiana’s STEP program that were surveyed, four were eliminated from the entire study 
because of missing information regarding their tolerance of discretion; and list-wise deletion was 
performed for three additional survey participates who did not select their race in analyses where 
race was a variable.  Therefore, 57 parish managers were included in descriptive statistics and in 
analyses involving negative stereotypes about clients and tolerance of discretion, and 53 parish 
managers were included in analyses involving race, negative stereotypes about clients, and 
tolerance of discretion. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Negative Stereotypes about Clients 
 As shown in Table 5.1, two-thirds (66.7%) of parish managers selected at least one 
negative stereotype about clients as one of the top three barriers to success within the STEP 
program.  Only one manager (1.8%) of 57 selected all three of his/her choices as a negative 
stereotype about clients; 29.3% selected two negative stereotypes as barriers to success in the 
STEP program; 35.1% selected one negative stereotype about clients as a barrier to success.  The 
mean value was 1 with a standard deviation of 0.85.  The minimum value was 0, and the 






Table 5.1 Frequency Distribution of Negative Stereotypes 
Number of Negative 
Stereotypes about Clients 
n Percent 
0 19 33.3 
1 20 35.1 
2 17 29.8 
3 1 1.8 
n = 57, 3 sample units were deleted based on missing information 
 The most common negative stereotype selected by parish managers was a belief that 
clients lacked personal responsibility (48.3%).  This was the second most common response 
listed as a barrier to success within the STEP program behind lack of education (65%).  The 
second most common negative stereotype was lack of motivation (38.5%). The belief that the 
effort is not rewarded and started their families too young was selected by very few (5% and 
3.3%, respectively).  No one selected too many children as a barrier to success.  Table 5.2 lists 
barriers to success identified by parish managers in order of the frequency with which responses 
were selected. 
Table 5.2 Frequency Distribution of Barriers to Success within the STEP Program 
Rank Variable n Percent 
1 Lack of Education 39 68.9 
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2 *Lack of Personal Responsibility 29 50.9 
3 Lack of Job Skills  27 47.4 
4 Lack of Transportation 25 43.9 
5 *Lack of Motivation 23 40.4 
6 Lack of Available Jobs 13 22.8 
7 Other 4 7 
8 *Belief that the Effort is not Rewarded 3 5.3 
9 *Started Their Families Too Young 2 3.5 
10 Suffer from Mental Illness 1 1.8 
10 Suffer from Domestic Violence 1 1.8 
10 Lack of Available Childcare 1 1.8 
11 *Have Too Many Children 0 0 
11 Suffer from Substance Abuse 0 0 
*Indicates that the variable is a negative stereotype about clients; n = 57 
Discretion Tolerance 
 When determining whether someone is required to participate in STEP, over 50% of 
managers said that the decision was straightforward (see Table 5.3).  Approximately one-third 
stated that the requirement to participate in STEP merited a decision by the caseworker based on 
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his/her knowledge of the client, indicating discretion.  A small number of managers (6.7%) did 
not respond to this question.  
When determining the type of work activity in which STEP participants should engage,  
the majority of managers (n =51, 85%) said that the decision required discretion based on the 
caseworker’s knowledge of the client (see Table 5.3). Two managers did not respond to this 
question. 
 When determining whether to sanction a client, nearly one-third of managers (31.7%) 
stated that no discretion was necessary.  Sixty-three percent said that discretion was required in 
order to make the decision to sanction a client. Three managers (5%) did not respond of this 
question. 
Table 5.3 Frequency Distribution of Discretion Tolerance  




Straightforward 35 58.3 
Requires Caseworker Decision 21 35.0 
No Response 4 6.7 
Work Activity Assignment 
(H1b) 
  
Straightforward 6 10.0 
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Requires Caseworker Decision 51 85.0 
No Response 2 5.0 
Sanction decision (H1c)   
Straightforward 19 31.7 
Requires Caseworker Decision 38 63.3 
No Response 3 5.0 
n = 57 
 Race 
 Most parish managers of the STEP program were white (61.7%).  Just over a quarter 
listed one of five minority categories as their race. Ten percent did not respond to the question. 
 
Table 5.4 Frequency Distribution for Parish Manager Race 
Race n Percent 
White 37 61.7 
Non-White 17 27.8 
No Response 6 10.5 




Table 5.5 Parish Manager Demographics 
 Percentage 
Gendera  
     Female  80.8 
     Male  19.2 
Ethnicityb  
     White  61.7 
     African American 26.7 
     Hispanic 0.0 
     Native American 1.7 
     Asian 0.0 
     Other 0.0 
Level of Educationc  
     School/GED 1.7 
     Some college 18.3 
     College graduate 55.0 
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     Graduate School 13.3 
 
Note. Values represent percentages of survey respondent selecting each response. an = 52. bn = 
60. cn = 53. Table taken from Livermore et al. (2007, p. D-1). 
Bivariate Results 
None of the hypothesis produced statistically significant results in this study. 
 For H1a, a one-tailed Spearman’s rho (β) correlation revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between negative stereotypes about clients and tolerance of discretion in 
determining whether someone is required to participate in STEP (Correlation Coefficient = -.05, 
p = .34)(see Table 5.6). 
 For H1b, a one-tailed Spearman’s rho (β) correlation revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between negative stereotypes about clients and tolerance of discretion in 
determining the type of work activity in which a STEP participant should engage (Correlation 
Coefficient = -.11, p =  .21)(see Table 5.6). 
 For H1c, a one-tailed Spearman’s rho (β) correlation revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between negative stereotypes about clients and tolerance of discretion in 
determining when a FITAP or STEP recipient should be sanctioned, however this weak positive 
relationship did approach significance (Correlation Coefficient = .19, p = .07)(see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6 Correlations Between Negative Stereotypes and Discretion Tolerance 
Hypothesis Correlation Coefficient p 
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H1a: Requiring STEP 
Participation 
-.06 .34 
H1b: Work Activities 
Assignment 
-.11 .21 
H1c: Sanctioning .19 .07 
n = 57 
 For H2, a one-tailed Spearman’s rho (β) correlation revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between negative stereotypes about clients and the race of parish managers 
(Correlation Coefficient = .02, p =  .44).  
 Six parish managers were not included in the chi-squared (x2) analysis due to missing 
information regarding the race of parish managers.  While the majority of managers reported that 
no discretion was required to determine whether someone is required to participate in STEP, 
41.7% of white managers and 37.5% of non-white managers reported tolerating discretion in this 
instance (see Figure 1).  For H3a, a chi-squared (x2) analysis revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between the race of parish managers and tolerance of discretion in determining 
whether someone is required to participate in STEP (x2 = .08, p = .77). 
When determining the type of work activity in which a STEP participant should engage, 
94.6% of white parish managers reported tolerating discretion, while 81.3% of non-white parish 
managers reported tolerating discretion (see Figure 1).  For H3b, a chi-squared (x2) analysis 
revealed no statistically significant relationship between the race of managers and tolerance of 
discretion in determining the type of work activity in which a STEP participant should engage 
(x2 = 2.328, p = .127). 
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 With regards to determining when a FITAP or STEP recipient should be sanctioned, 
white and non-white parish managers tolerated discretion at nearly the same rate.  Sixty-eight 
percent of white managers tolerated discretion, while 69% of non-white managers tolerated 
discretion (see Figure 1).  For H3c, a chi-squared (x2) analysis revealed no statistically significant 
relationship between the race of parish managers and tolerance of discretion in determining when 
a FITAP or STEP recipient should be sanctioned (x2 = .007, p = .93). 
 
Figure 1 Cross Tabulation of Race and Discretion Tolerance  




















CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Client Motivation vs. Structural Barriers 
 Although none of the hypothesized relationships posed in this study proved to be 
significant, one important finding revealed that 66.7% of managers reported that at least one 
barrier to success within STEP was due to a lack of client motivation for change.  The fact that 
the second most common barrier that managers selected was a lack of personal responsibility (-
50.9%) should also be noted.  This means that the majority of managers partially blame clients 
for their lack of success in STEP even though lack of education was the most noted cause and a 
substantial minority also noted that job skills, transportation, and available jobs play a role in 
clients’ struggles to achieve and maintain employment.  This echoes the findings of Taylor et al. 
(2011) in that even in the face of large structural challenges, many managers still cite client 
motivation as one of the main reasons clients are not successful in welfare-to-work programs.   
What this current study added to Taylor et al.’s (2011) findings is that both white and 
non-white managers engaged in stereotyping clients negatively.  This finding is in contrast to 
Taylor et al.’s (2011) claim that these negative stereotypes are a product of white managers 
discriminating against a largely African-American population.  One reason for this finding may 
be that only seventeen managers were not white whereas there were thirty-seven white managers.  
If managers more evenly distributed across race or if the sample size were larger, the results may 
have reflected more nuanced outcomes. 
Another possible explanation for the fact that no significant relationship was found 
neither between discretion and negative stereotyping nor between discretion and race is that 
discretion may not necessarily be good intentioned within the STEP program.  As stated earlier, 
Berman et al. (2004) speculate that more discretion on the part of STEP workers would create 
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better outcomes for STEP clients even though previous research on frontline discretion showed 
that discretion could be either positive or negative depending on the ethical nature of its use 
(Lipsky, 1980).  In fact, Lipsky’s (1980) research explicitly linked stereotyping to negative 
outcomes for clients in cases where case managers were over-worked or under trained.  
Variance within a Centralized System 
 Another important finding in this study is that the implementation of the STEP program 
varies greatly among parishes despite its intent to be a centralized state system.  This conclusion 
is based on the evidence that manager opinions differed greatly in terms of when caseworkers 
should use discretion.  For example, STEP policy clearly states that job placements should be 
determined by a group staffing in which STEP workers discuss the information obtained by each 
client during the assessment process and make an individualized decision based on the groups’ 
judgment (Berman et al., 2004). The fact that 10% of managers stated that no decision was 
required demonstrates either a lack of understanding or a disregard of policy procedures in 
relation to the job placement process.  Also, under STEP policy, clients should only be 
sanctioned as a last resort (Berman et al., 2004), and yet 19% of managers stated that sanctioning 
did not require a decision based on the caseworkers’ knowledge of the client.   
If parish managers, who are charged with the task of ensuring program fidelity, do not 
adhere to STEP policies, uniformity of services throughout the state will mostly certainly not be 
accomplished.  These variances in the delivery of services are in line with Evans’ (2011) claim 
that managers contribute to the changes that occur within policy implementation.  Therefore, 
Evans (2011) was correct in saying that managers are not a homogenous group whose sole 
intention is to implement policies as Lipsky (1980) claimed.  These findings further emphasize 
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the need for more examination of the role that managers play within the welfare system, even 
thought the reasons for this discretion have not been identified in this research. 
Differences in Managers vs. Clients’ Perceptions of Barriers to Success 
Livermore et al. (2007) conducted telephone surveys and in-person interviews with STEP 
participants as part of a larger evaluation of the STEP program.  During the evaluation process, 
clients were asked about the barriers to their success within the program.  The findings of 
Livermore et al.’s (2007) study hold relevance to the current study as it allows for comparison 
between client perceptions of their barriers to success versus managers perceptions of clients’ 
barriers to success.   
While both clients and managers agreed that lack of transportation greatly affected clients 
ability to work, several clients also spoke of problems with mental health issues and finding 
childcare (Livermore et al., 2007) whereas only one manager listed these variables as barriers to 
employment.  In Livermore et al.’s (2007) study, 17.6% of parents stated that childcare was a 
major problem in their search for employment, and 5.15% of parents said that it was somewhat 
of a problem.  Additionally, 19% of parents said that they had to miss work or school in the last 
month because of a lack of available childcare (Livermore et al., 2007). 
While only 14% of STEP participants who participated in the telephone survey noted that 
their mental health was either not very good, poor or very poor overall, many who participated in 
the face-to-face interviews spoke more candidly about their struggles with emotional and mental 
health (Livermore et al., 2007).  During the interviews, clients “reported feelings of depression, 
anger, moodiness, helplessness and hopelessness, and some even reported thoughts of suicide or 
a need to ‘escape’ from their situation for a while” (Livermore et al., 2007, p. 4-10). 
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The disparities between managers and clients views of barriers to employment point to a 
disconnection in understanding for policy administrators and the populations they serve.  This 
further supports Taylor et al.’s (2011) claim that welfare workers’ views of clients as lazy and 
unmotivated may have more to do with underestimating the mental health and structural barriers 
their clients face than they realize.  
Limitations and Considerations for Future Research 
This study was limited due to the nature of bivariate analysis and the fact that the entire 
population of Louisiana STEP managers consisted of a small sample.  Ultimately, this study did 
not accomplish its goal of gaining insight into the correlates of discretion.  Uncovering the 
causes and consequences of discretion requires a more complex study that takes into account all 
the possible variables contributing to this process.  This bivariate analysis only took into account 
managers’ perceptions.  Future research should compare managers’ perceptions about how 
caseworkers made decisions about their clients with what caseworker actually did. 
Further research should employ multivariate analyses that takes into account some of the 
variables outlined in the literature review such as the size of caseloads and confusion among 
caseworkers about eligibility, sanctioning, assessment tools, and performance indicators. 
Elements of Wiessert’s (1994) study, including variables such as local job prospects, education 
and work experience of managers and staff, race of clients, local resources, and political 
ideology, many also be of value to compare among the various STEP offices.  A more complex 
study such as this would hopefully paint a better picture of the roles that discretion, negative 
stereotyping of clients, and race play within the program than the current study did.  Also, further 
research could be done to determine if client outcomes - such as program completion, job 
attainment, and salary - are related to managers’ negative stereotypes about clients.  
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The findings of this study highlight the need for more research into the managerial role 
within welfare policy in hopes of better educating managers on the effects their actions have for 
their clients.  The STEP program has the important task of expanding their clients’ capacity for 
self-sufficiency within Louisiana’s welfare system.  Therefore, by looking at the managerial 
styles of the parishes with the best and worst outcomes for clients could be invaluable in creating 
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